Introduction Industrial networks in the context of economic transition
Traditional microeconomics has been dominated by the concept of the firm. Firms have been viewed as discrete organisations, relating to each other through the medium of arm's-length trade, and maintaining an absolute distinction between internal and external domains. Recognition in the post-war period of the growing importance of international firms has seen the development of theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) to supplement the traditional theory of the firm, but transnational corporation (TNC) theory has largely held fast to the traditional view of the firm in that it has interpreted foreign investment primarily as a means of extending the domain of internalisation across international borders (Dunning, 1988) .
Over the past decade or so there has been a growing recognition that in the real world of contemporary business the patterns of linkage between companies may be at least as important as the companies themselves, and that those patterns may involve forms of transaction and business relationship which defy neat pigeon-holing as either internal or external. Buyer-supplier relations are fundamental to the working of a market economy. Economic activity, however, is not a simple matter of supply and demand in perfect markets without interaction/transaction costs. In a real economy buyers and suppliers have to communicate to each other their delivery requirements, what they can provide, what help they can offer in producing something new, what time scales are involved, what terms of payment are acceptable, and so on, all in a volatile environment where they do not know exactly how much they will need, what future prices will be like, and how reliable their partner really is. Relationships that help to overcome market uncertainties and aid in communicating needs and capabilities can, indeed must, develop between buyers and suppliers. The basis, depth, breadth and development of these links may vary depending on the environment in which companies are embedded.
In developing the theory of international production networks (IPNs), scholars like Zysman have argued that global business is increasingly dominated by networks, based not on equity ownership as such, but rather on ownership of intellectual property rights and control over key technologies. Research on patterns of regional development has highlighted the importance of localised networks as vehicles for the exploitation of external economies of scale. And networks have also been pin-pointed as key instruments of technology transfer, and hence of innovation, involving public-or semi-publicsector actors like government agencies and universities as well as firms as such (Freeman & Soete, 1997) . Finally, supply networks have been identified as key elements in the success of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) of East Asia (Hobday, 1995) .
The ambivalent nature of networks in terms of the internalisation/externalisation dichotomy is highlighted by the range of socio-legal bases used as a framework for their operation. Contracts can be important, but networks are often based as much on trust (such as one would normally find within a company) as on formal legal commitments.
All of these dimensions of industrial networking are of particular importance in the context of transition from communism. The ex-communist countries are, in a sense, NICs manqué. Communist development strategy was essentially based on industrial development, with clearly defined sectoral priorities (primarily on heavy industry) and strong (if in practice not very clear) ideas about how different enterprises should relate to each other in hierarchical terms. The Soviet Union and the GDR were notable for their development of the ob"edinenie (association)/ kombinat principle, under which groups of cognate enterprises were brought together in pyramidal structures with highly centralised formal structures, in keeping with the principles of centralised, command planning which generally informed the planning systems of those countries. In practice these industrialised pyramids were rather less centralised than they were supposed to be, because the centralised system could not cope with the realities of industrial supply without some help from 'grey' market elements (Dyker, 1992) . Under Yugoslav market socialism, which prevailed in Slovenia until 1991, similar pyramids were established within the framework of 'complex organisations of associated labour' (sestavljene organizacije zdruzenego dela -SOZD) and 'basic organisations of associated labour' (temeljne organizacije zdruzenego dela -TOZD) (Dyker, 1990) In Hungary the 1970s witnessed a process of concentration of industrial production capacity in bigger enterprises, a process that was then, to a degree, reversed in the 1980s, though big enterprises remained dominant. These policy themes were played out against the background of a varied organisational structure, with trusts, associations and big enterprises heading a variety of hierarchies involving different patterns of mutual dependence and inter-firm linkage. Details apart, Yugoslav/Slovenian and Hungarian hierarchies were generally flatter than in the Soviet/East German case, because they formed part of national economic systems based, to a degree, on market principles, and the primary units within industrial pyramids retained a substantial degree of operational independence in Yugoslavia and Hungary.
Mainly for that reason, supply networks in Hungary and Yugoslavia developed in a qualitatively different way from the more conventional, centrally-planned, socialist systems. But there were other differences as well. In Hungary, many of the most successful conglomerates were in the agricultural and food sectors, in despite of traditional communist priorities. And in Slovenia, one of the most prominent SOZDs was the electronics giant Iskra, which managed to maintain competitiveness in a sector in which most of the communist economies were notoriously weak. Iskra's annual exports in the 1980s averaged around $400 m. Some of this went to Western markets, and although the question of price competitiveness is clouded by the complex system of tariffs and export incentives in force in the old Yugoslavia, there can be no doubt that Iskra products were competitive, in terms of quality, on those markets.
Formal industrial hierarchies were reinforced, sometimes to a degree modified, by Communist Party links and 'old boys' networks' going back, in many cases, to the period of the Second World War. The result was structures with very powerful linkages -at their most powerful in the military-industrial complex (Harter, 1998) . But while the linkages were strong, the nodes were weak. Communist industrial networks transferred little technology or know-how, because the nodes involved had little knowledge, tacit 1 or otherwise, that was worth transferring, and because they were not plugged into the international networks which tend to provide the most powerful conduits of technology transfer.
There were exceptions, particularly in the market-socialist countries.
The Iskra network in Yugoslavia/Slovenia did provide significant channels of technology interchange, and there were a few islands of such interchange in the Hungarian pharmaceuticals industry. But the typical industrial network in Hungary or Yugoslavia was no more dynamic than the typical network in the Soviet Union. And the static nature of most networks was reflected in the universal crisis of productivity which overtook the entire communist bloc 2 in the 1970s and 1980s, and which was one of the main underlying reasons for the collapse of the communist economic systems.
Transition, transformation and network realignment
In studying the development/redevelopment of industrial networks in the transition period, we are seeking to identify the extent to which industrial networks do, or may, contribute to the redynamisation of the economies concerned -the reestablishment of efficient channels of technology transfer, the reinforcement of upward trends in productivity, the reintegration of regional industrial complexes, including those that cut across international borders, and effective reintegration into global economic processes. We are also looking to situate this process of redevelopment within the framework of the broader emerging pattern of 'East'-'West' network alignment. In that context we are aiming to situate the Hungarian and Slovenian firm in relation to markets, in relation to an overlapping complex of local, national and global networks, and in relation to the EU, and the Hungarian and Slovenian states (See Figure 1, below) . The research is 1 Tacit knowledge is knowledge that cannot be transferred through conventional means such as license documentation and training manuals. It is embedded in a particular organisation or a particular group of people, and can only be transferred through continual, hands-on contact betwen transferer and transferee. See Rosenberg & Frischtag, 1985, preface. 2 China is an exception for reasons that do not require detailed discussion in the present context. based on broad engagement by the authors in the process of industrial transformation in the target countries and a wide reading of the industrial organisation literature from those countries, reinforced by c.50 in-depth company interviews from each of them.
Markets and Networks -Contracts, Trust and the Meaning of Close Cooperation

Trust and contracts
To what extent are supply networking relationships in Hungary and Slovenia driven by trust and embodied in informal commitments, rather than in the formal commitments of contracts and legal recourse? The theoretical literature on trust suggests that the formal and informal aspects of business negotiation are essentially complementary.
The more formal processes of negotiation, transaction, and administration associated with most business transactions are also accompanied by informal processes of sense-making, understanding, and committing. The informal processes that take place in each of these formal stages of putting together a business deal provide opportunities for economic actors to directly experience the observance of norms such as equity or reciprocity. (Ring, 1997, pp.129-30) Still, consideration of the general weakness of legal and institutional structures in the former communist countries might lead us to expect a less balanced view of formal and informal aspects of business negotiation in our two target countries. In fact, our interviews provided a very strong affirmation of Ring's view of the complementarity of formal and informal aspects. Trust and contracts emerged as in no sense alternatives 3 . In an ideal world you would have both. Trust is certainly the most important thing, particularly for smaller firms, but however much trust there is, there is no harm in having a contract as well, even if it is an essentially open-ended contract which can be modified to take account of changing circumstances as cooperation between the firms concerned develops. The key point is that contracts are uniformly seen as codifications of trust, rather than as threats. As such, they do not offer the networking firm options, but simply allow him to reinforce and 'cap' an essentially informal relationship with a formal layer.
In one sub-group of the interview sets the picture is somewhat different. Relations between foreign owners (a very important group in Hungary) and their subsidiaries are articulated largely on the basis of standard and special contracts, in accordance with circumstances, and there is little evidence of any kind of special relationship going beyond contracts. Even here, however, there is no impression of contracts being seen as a substitute for trust. Rather the general principle is that firms trust other firms because they have trusted them in the past and have had no reason to regret that trust. The interview material in relation to foreign firms and their subsidiaries suggests that this is a process that takes time, even when you actually own the firm whose trust is in question. It also implies that the dialectic of trust and formal commitment may be significantly different in the case of international networks from that of national and local ones.
The relationship between closeness of cooperation and depth of cooperation
A priori reasoning would suggest that close cooperation, defined in terms of cooperation in R&D, would normally imply deep cooperation, defined in terms of a sharing of strategic management functions. 4 In conditions of transition, however, the picture may not be so simple. Firms may engage in R&D cooperation as part of a short-term survival strategy oriented exclusively to the domestic market, while the R&D activity of foreign-owned firms may be largely geared to the adaptation of existing designs and products for specific markets or clients (Inzelt, 1999) . A classic example of close cooperation that does, indeed, mean deep cooperation is provided by one of our Slovenian interviewees, which we will refer to as SL-41. SL-41 cooperates closely with its suppliers on the design of components, and with its clients in the design of final products. Cooperation is continual, with frequent interviews. But where interviewees expressed strong views to the effect that either contracts or trust were more important in one response, they often contradicted this position in other responses. 4 The distinction between close and deep cooperation appears frequently in the literature, but the terminology used varies from author to author. Lundvall ((1992) , Dosi (1988) , Avadikyan et al. (1993) , Storper (1994) and Sabel (1994) stress the importance of 'learning networks`, i.e. networks which involve not just R&D, but innovation. Inzelt (1999) , in her study of R&D cooperation in Hungary, distinguishes between 'skin-deep' and 'root-and-branch' cooperation. In discussing learning networks, Sabel also uses the term thickness to descibe the capacity of a network to raise the performance levels of participants through critical transfers of knowledge;, see also Bianchi and Miller (1994) and Dei Ottati (1994) . Tanaka (1998) describes 'accumulated technology zones' in Japan within which 'information and experiences, new technical knowledge and orders from outside are circulated to each other….even by walking or bicycling… Waves of product innovations have been supported by process innovation based on this networking. ' (p.122) face-to-face meetings, maximising the scope for the transfer of tacit knowledge, and technological cooperation with buyers is intimately connected with the transfer of knowledge about market conditions from buyers to the firm. One of the Hungarian firms interviewed (let us give it the code name HU-15) shows a rather different pattern. Here is a classic first-tier supplier, 100% foreign-owned, which has, up to now, practised very close, and deep, R&D cooperation with the lead firm. But the tendency is for the depth of R&D cooperation to diminish, with plans to set up a separate R&D centre at HU-15 in 2001. And this is happening because the lead firm and owner of HU-15 see it as a way of increasing the overall R&D effectiveness of the whole group.
Supply Hierarchies and Network Alignments
The relationship between closeness of cooperation and position in the hierarchy of supply Just as the relationship between closeness of cooperation and depth of cooperation is a complex one, so the relationship between closeness of cooperation and the hierarchy of supply relationships is not straightforward. If we think in terms of three-level hierarchies, with first-tier suppliers supplying complex parts like engines or gear boxes involving a significant level of design inputs, second-tier suppliers providing advanced single components to first-tier and third-tier suppliers simple components to second-tier suppliers, 5 we would expect that second-and third-tier suppliers could be involved in anything from close to minimal cooperation. Our interviews did, indeed, confirm that hypothesis. A priori reasoning suggests that first-tier suppliers would, ipso facto, be involved in close cooperation. In this case, however, the interviews present a more complex picture than indicated by the a priori reasoning. There is certainly a clear relationship between product complexity and intensity of cooperation, stronger on the buyer than on the supplier side, and that makes sense in a priori terms if we think of first-tier suppliers as companies that design and make complex, customised products. But there are individual case studies that diverge sharply from this picture. Thus a Slovenian interviewee (SL-15), which makes alternators, starter motors and DC motors for the car industry, is a first-tier supplier which collaborates on R&D with its suppliers, but not with its customers. The reason for this, however, is not the weakness of its R&D profile, but rather its strength. SL-15 is powerful enough in R&D to be able to exercise the design and R&D function independently of its main buyers, though always with the specific requirements of those buyers in mind. And there is an added twist to this story, which brings into sharp relief the technological dynamism which so often underlies the evolution of supply networks. SL-15 is technologically independent now, but it began its technological odyssey by taking out licenses from an international firm which is, today, one of its main buyers, a firm which has indeed, been reluctant to transfer more than the minimum amount of technology to its suppliers. SL-15's success in building a position of technological independence on this modest beginning echoes the experience of Japanese and Korean firms in the 1960s and 1970s (Bell, 1997, p.68) . Moving back to the case of HU-15, it is clear that if the policy of developing separate R&D at HU-15 is taken to its logical conclusion, HU-15 could cease to have even close, never mind deep, R&D cooperation with its lead company and owner. Matters are in practice unlikely to go that far. However strong HU-15 becomes in relation to R&D, it will always need to be able to exchange tacit knowledge with the lead company, and that is impossible without close cooperation. Furthermore, while development of the separate identity of HU-15's R&D activity may mean less intensive cooperation as such, it is likely to deepen the R&D division of labour between HU-15 and the other companies in its group.
Patterns of supply hierarchy, levels of economic development and ownership patterns
Detailed perusal of the interviews brought out one very striking and interesting difference between our two target countries.
While there are one or two domestically-owned first-tier suppliers in Hungary, they are a rare breed, and only one of them was included in the interview set. In Slovenia, by contrast, we found a number of domestically-owned companies operating as first-tier suppliers to foreign companies within the interview set. This is no doubt in part a reflection of the fact that general levels of social productivity, as reflected in GDP per capita, is substantially higher in Slovenia than it is in Hungary. 6 But it is particularly interesting that all of the Slovenian-owned first-tier suppliers are daughtercompanies of the old, communist-era electronics giant Iskra. It seems, then, that specific elements of know-how and human capital inherited from particular companies developed during the previous period may have been a crucial factor in establishing first-tier-supplier status here. These inferences find support in independent, sector-specific case studies. Thus Havas (1999) , concludes, on the basis of a case study of the automotive industry in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, that 'indigenous suppliers cannot survive without a foreign partnerwith which they have long-term contracts -or being taken over... At least some of them, however, can perform much higher value-added tasks, by exploring and continually developing their skill base, as partners of, or acquired by, foreignowned first-or second-tier suppliers... One thing is sure... It is not feasible to "raise" -or keep alive -"national" first-tier suppliers.' (pp.36-7) Bleak as this assessment may sound, it does hold out hope that the economies concerned may, as dynamic economies, hope to pass the crucial threshold within the next few years. 7
Can foreign-owned first-tier suppliers help domestically-owned firms to achieve that status? Hungary is a particularly useful reference country in relation to this question because it has so many foreign-owned firms. Where foreign owners compel their subsidiaries to give preference to suppliers within the group (which usually means a foreign supplier), the answer is clearly no. But where foreignowned first-tier suppliers have their origin in privatisation of existing firms rather than greenfield developments, the general pattern is for them to retain their supply network links with domestic companies. An example is a foreign-owned Hungarian firm which we we interviewed, and which we will refer to as HU-2. That company clearly perceives its own business interest in raising its suppliers from the status of lohnarbeiter to that of independent, second-tier suppliers. But it does not help them to address the task of progressing from the status of independent second-tier supplier to that of first-tier supplier. HU-15 has used its market power to force second-tier suppliers to raise their game, and conducts joint R&D operations with its most important supplier -but that supplier is, in fact, owned by the same international company that owns HU-15! Another Hungarian interviewee (alias HU-38) is an outstanding, foreign-owned, first-tier supplier, but all of its own main suppliers are also foreign-owned. While foreignowned first-tier suppliers differ widely, therefore, in their strategies vis-à-vis other suppliers, there is no evidence from our interviews to suggest that they do much to help domestic firms win promotion to a higher level within the supply hierarchy Can a foreign-owned second-tiier supplier use its links with an international group to help it to develop into a first-tier supplier? One Hungarian firm we interviewed (alias HU-18) started off as an outward processor before establishing itself as in internationally competitive producer of advanced auto components like automotive cables and car radios. It is now aiming to progress from technical cooperation with its main customer -its owner -to the establishment of an independent R&D system, which should provide a foundation for the achievement of first-tier-supplier status -while at the same time reducing the degree of technical cooperation with the owner company. Another Hungarian interviewee (we called it HU-27) has, under foreign ownership, moved up from the status of second-tier to that of first-tier supplier in the sector of electronic valves. It has, at the same time, tended to move away from its parent company, while at the same time conducting an explicit policy of developing domestic Hungarian third-tier suppliers. So our answer to this second question is more positive than our answer to the first..
How important is it to be a first-tier supplier?
As the cases of HU-15 and SL-15 illustrate graphically, to be a first-tier supplier is to be, in a sense, a 'champion' of the supply networks -to participate actively in the generation and exchange of new scientific and technical knowledge, to develop new product lines, to engage in the matrix of supply relations at the points where the rate of value added is at its highest. You can be a market leader at home and abroad as a second-tier supplier, but you are condemned to remain a kind of commodity supplier. It must be remembered, however, that there are no first-tier suppliers without supply hierarchies, and the notion of supply hierarchy has been developed very much on the basis of the patterns prevalent in the key automotive and electronics industries. Some of the companies we interviewed live in a much simpler world. A prime example is alias HU-21, a firm producing medical equipment for prosthesis and implantation. HU-21 is the leading company of its kind in Hungary, and operates a system of continuous innovation. It is a paragon of 'nimbleness', being able to deliver complex products within a few hours of order -clearly a crucial business advantage in an area of medical technology where an hour may represent the difference between life and death. It encourages its main clients -doctors -to become actively involved in its R&D programmes. HU-21 is one of Hungary's top companies, and it is 100% domestically owned. It is a key technology networker, admittedly within a small and highly specialised area. But it will never show up as a first-tier supplier because it is, in fact, a first-, secondand third-tier supplier rolled into one.
Networking and outward processing
Outward-processing agreements have played a key role in the globalisation of the CEECs during the 1990s, and have been of particular importance in relation to German business involvement in Poland, for example, where equity ownership raises political problems. Thus German OPT with Poland accounted for over 30 per cent of total EU15 OPT with the CEE-4 (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) in 1996 (Pellegrin, 1999, p.4) . OPT agreements were in the first instance designed to exploit the scope for gaining exemption from tariffs on goods imported into the EU in cases where the materials used in the manufacture of the goods concerned had been exported from the EU in the first place. But while there has been some levelling-off in volumes of OPT in recent years, as trade liberalisation has reduced the value of such exemptions, the OPT trade category remains an important one for the CEECs.
The sectors involved are usually low-technology sectors, where R&D hardly comes into the question. Thus in 1996 textiles and clothing, footwear and furniture, together accounted for nearly 75% of total OPT re-imports into the EU (Pellegrin, 1999, p.6) . That is not to say that outward processing relationships involve no transfer of 'soft' management and organisational technology from lead firm to collaborating firm. But it does mean that lead firms do not consider it necessary, in the context of relatively simple production technologies, to internalise the determinants of labour productivity through acquisition of the supplying firm. Here lead firms are basically looking for cheap labour, confident that collaborating firms can keep control of labour productivity -and knowing that if they fail to do so, the financial loss will be theirs, not the lead firm's. None of this is to suggest that there is nothing in outward-processing deals in traditional sectors for the collaborating firm. It does gain access, even if only indirect, to international markets -and it can, with shrewd management, gain much more in the way of technology transfer than the lead firm might consider minimally necessary.
Where cross-border business relationships in other sectors take an OPT form, the content of the relationship may be much more dynamic and far-reaching The one 'middle-tech' sector which figures significantly in the aggregate statistics for OPT is electrical machinery, which accounted for 13.6 per cent of total OPT re-imports into the EU in 1996 (Pellegrin, 1999, p.6) . And here case material demonstrates the possibility of OPT-based trajectories which may take firms a long-way beyond the basic OPT model.
The case of Vilati (Budapest) is illuminating in this respect. Vilati is a small company producing control systems, printed circuit boards and other electrical and electronic components.
Although it has several OPT partners, Vilati has a privileged relation with Brunswick Bowling (US). It is integrated into the production chain of its main OPT partner in a rather flexible way, but it does not purport to recover independence, nor does it count on integrating its partner's production chain and upgrad[ing] its position within it. In fact, if Vilati is more loosely associated to its foreign partners than if it were full integrated, this is not to say that its relations are more fragile, or unstable. Its strategy is indeed to establish its reputation as reliable and technologically updated supplier of component system[s] to Original Equipment Manufacturers. In this case OPT is used as a vehicle for implementing methods of production in line with the new requirements of international competition in terms of flexibility and quality.
OPT goes together with the automisation and the decomposition of the production process into stages which are more independent and 'deintegrated' from one another. (Pellegrin, 1999, p.16) Material from the interviews provides striking confirmation of Pellegrin's interpretation of middle-tech OPT, and suggest that it may extend beyond the area of electrical machinery. Thus a Slovenian interviewee which we will refer to as SL-35 is a classic instance of outward processing in the sense that its main supplier is also its main buyer. But SL-35 makes highly sophisticated plastic products for biomedicine, mostly for dialysis. And while the initial competitive advantage of SL-35 in OPT was very much based on cheap labour, the company has learned, as real wages have risen in Slovenia, to shift the emphasis to quality and flexibility. A similar story is unfolding with another Slovenian company (alias SL-43), a second-tier supplier of auto parts, specialising in driver seats, which has, over less than a decade, worked up from a straight OPT position to one whereby the buyer is looking to pursue joint development with the firm. HU-2, which produces coupler heads and trailer parts, is the only firm in Hungary that produces such parts to the given level of technology and precision, and it exports under its own name. But in addition it has an OPT relationship with a foreign firm which is also its part-(50%)owner, with the foreign firm selling some of HU-2's output under its trademark. Interestingly, HU-2 also has OPT-type relations with its own domestic suppliers, in the sense that it procures materials for them as well as buying their output. But it sees this arrangement as purely temporary. Again, the impression is that OPT is an essentially functional arrangement, which may correspond to a particular stage in the development of a firm, but which can be quickly jettisoned by mutual consent as conditions change. Changes in corporate policy vis-à-vis OPT can be quite dramatic, and far-reaching in their implications. Thus in 1999, a Hungarian manufacturer of complex pieces of machinery (alias HU-19), decided to hive off OPT operations into a separate company, cutting the total work-force by 50% in the process (though there had been no significant increase in real wages over the previous few years). Even where the OPT stance of a particular company is in evolution, it rarely involves much that could be described as R&D. But the infrequency of OPT-based R&D cooperation does not mean that OPT generally excludes innovation. Thus one modest Hungarian engineering firm we interviewed (alias HU-25), with half its turnover accounted for by OPT, has still managed to introduce a significant number of new products in recent years. In one key respect, the pattern of OPT among the firms interviewed is quite different from the standard pattern of OPT in low-tech sectors. In those latter sectors, the whole point, for the lead firm, is not to get involved in ownership of the suppliers. Among engineering firms, at least in Hungary, firms doing OPT are often wholly or partly owned by the lead firm. This makes sense, because the more technologically complex the activity, the more operations there are that may have to be to some degree internalised to the lead firm if they are to be carried out efficiently. In all this lead firms, and indeed to a degree subsidiary firms, retain much of the flexibility of the basic OPT model, because the subsidiary firms involved are usually small, with modest asset endowments, so that divestment is generally as easy as investment.
These particular case-studies of OPT in engineering sectors cannot be taken to be typical of OPT in general, just as engineering cannot be taken to be typical sectors of the Slovenian and Hungarian economies. But they do demonstrate that there is scope within the framework of OPT to develop flexible business relationships which can help collaborating firms to absorb both hard and soft technology from lead firms, to react quickly and sensibly to changes in real wage costs, and to develop product range and quality to the extent that they can come on to international markets as OEM manufacturers. Thus the material from the interview sets confirms that OPT is much more than just a ruse to exploit loopholes in foreign trade regulations, and may survive and indeed develop in an age when those loopholes have ceased to be relevant, as a major vehicle of international supply networking..
Cooperation with buyers as a springboard for upgrading and innovation
One of the strongest themes to emerge from the research, strongly reinforced by the interview responses, is that of the buyer company as teacher. Buyers are consistently the most important sources of technology transfer, consistently the strongest pressure for increases in operational efficiency. In many cases they provide training courses for suppliers' workforces. The buyer does not, of course, become a teacher through pure altruism. He helps suppliers to become more innovative and more efficient because he demands of them continual reductions in the prices of their supplies. So the systematic transfer of knowledge to suppliers is simply the other side of merciless pressure for cost reduction. From the interviews, we take one medium-sized precision engineering company (alias SL-24) as illustrative of how this process may transform the position of a given firm within the supply hierarchy. Traditionally a producer of meters, chronometers and timers, and one of the top companies in Europe in this market, SL-24 has found that, with the development of computers, the market for their established specialities is in decline. They have moved over into auto component supply, and aspire to first-tier supplier status, but do not as yet possess the technologies to support that status. Their strategy for acquiring the necessary technologies is essentially based on development of their relationship with their main buyer. Through cooperation with that company they have obtained an enormous amount of knowledge in the area of quality and work organisation, and have been able to introduce the system of continuous improvement. The buyer has also advised them in relation to development of their factory workspace and the introduction of new technology. In a word, SL-24's main buyer has given the Slovenian company an opportunity to overcome a technological and organisational barrier which might otherwise have proved insurmountable.
Cooperation with buyers as a vehicle of market research/information networking
The teaching role is certainly the loftiest role that buyers play. But it is not the only one. The buyer-teacher is also often the market researcher. Researching Western markets is always a problem for firms from the transition countries with few inherited networks with the West and limited funds. For small firms esearching markets is a problem world-wide. It is hardly surprising, then, that a large number of firms among our interview sets stressed their main buyers as key sources of information on market possibilities. This has important implications for the nature of networks. While at the level of technology and production cooperation they may tend to lock in, at the level of general market information they actually open up new possibilities for supplier firms -at one level internalising or partially internalising 'hard' processes, while at an other actually increasing the scope for externalised, market-driven transactions. Owners may play the same role as suppliers of market information -especially when they are foreign owners.
Once again a relationship which is in the first instance constraining may at some levels actually increase the firm's effective scope for independent action.
Industrial Networks and the Transition State
Most of the state aid policies currently carried on in Hungary and Slovenia will have to be abandoned on, or even prior to, accession. But there seems to be no reason why Slovenia's clustering programme and Hungary's sub-contracting programme should not continue. Neither of these programmes has been in operation long enough for assessment of results to be feasible. A few a priori points can, however be made, viz.-· Clusters in Slovenia: the proven capacity of the Slovenian economy to support first-tier suppliers means that there is genuine potential to build and reinforce vertically integrated industrial clusters within Slovenia. But the research project underpinning the clustering programme found that not a single one of the identified 'production-service systems' actually met the set criteria for a cluster (in terms of the given firm having at least three partners having cooperation with at least another three partners) This reflects the dearth of vertically-integrated big (i.e. effectively transnational) companies in Slovenia which could act as hubs within industrial districts. Given how small Slovenia is, and given that in the developed industrial regions of the world clusters run along main lines of communication rather than being concentrated in 'points' (see Veltz, 1991) , it hardly needs stressing that effective clustering policy will have to involve effective cooperation between national and EU levels. This seems to be a significant weak point in the Slovenian programme.
· The Subcontracting Programme in Hungary: this is primarily an information service aimed at briefing national and international business communities on the capabilities of SMEs in relation to industrial supply. Given the extreme weakness of the old communist system in the field of information, this is, indeed, an important service. But information alone will not help Hungarian firms to graduate to the status of first-tier supplier. The Hungarian subcontracting programme also offers educational and training services. These could be crucial in terms of correcting the imbalances in established education and R&D systems, and therefore helping companies to make real progress in terms of upgrading their capabilities. In all of this, however, it should be borne in mind that it is generally bigger firms that have the closest cooperation links (this generalization receives strong support from our interview responses). As discussed above, SME development is rightly a policy priority in Hungary, as it is in many other transition countries. But it is clear that SME development is likely to broaden out the supply networking base rather than upgrade it.
One very important rider must be added to this a priori analysis on the clustering and sub-contracting programmes. Our interviewees were largely negative, often quite scathing, about state programmes for industrial development. The few exceptions were companies which had benefited from specific incentives (usually in the context of foreign investment) or grants for specific purposes like the introduction of a quality control system. Private entrepreneurs are generally sceptical about state intervention in the economy, whatever country they come from, and it would be wrong to accept the evaluations of the interviewees on this matter uncritically. But the clustering and sub-contracting programmes will not work without a measure of cooperation from the business community. It is not clear that that cooperation will be forthcoming. What is clear, looking ahead to the next section, is that accession to the EU is unlikely to affect business attitudes to such programmes in any way.
Implications for EU Accession An overview
A priori reasoning suggests that accession to the European Union by Hungary and Slovenia would automatically strengthen the key networking factors highlighted in sections 2 -4, viz.-· Foreign investment makes for close cooperation; EU accession will surely make for more foreign investment.
· Inclusion in the internal market will facilitate exports from Hungary and Slovenia, thus strengthening the 'learning through networking' tendency.
· Inclusion in the internal market will, ipso facto, make it easier for Slovenian and Hungarian firms to achieve optimum scale of operations, which should be conducive to closer cooperation.
· Membership of the EU for the target countries will make it easier for foreign companies to trust local companies, notably through the extension of the EU intellectual property rights regime to them. This should, again, be conducive to closer cooperation.
· The combined operation of all these factors should make it easier for Hungarian and Slovenian firms to a) upgrade their technological level; b) attain the status of first-tier suppliers.
Each of these points finds support in more general arguments and empirical investigations in relation to the two target countries and to the transition region as a whole, and in the responses to our interviews. In some cases, however, important caveats and riders need to be entered, viz.-
Foreign investment
As Table 2 shows, Hungary dominates the transition region, and Eastern Europe within it, in terms of stock of FDI and cumulative FDI per capita. (2000), p.143 FDI as a percentage of annual gross fixed capital formation has been consistently above 20 per cent in Hungary throughout the transition period, placing that country firmly within the high-FDI group in world terms (Hunya, 1998, p.6 ). Hungary's outstanding performance on FDI inflow has been a function of a number of factors, notably a favourable legislative regime for FDI and an approach to privatisation which has facilitated sell-offs to large, wealthy (i.e. in most cases foreign) companies. The foreign investment regime has until recently been less favourable in Slovenia than in Hungary, and even now, after the passage of EUharmonised FDI legislation, enforcement of these new laws on local players remains problematic. The process of privatisation has also been much slower in Slovenia. We should, therefore, not be surprised to find that Slovenia accounts for a relatively modest proportion of total FDI in the region. Yet Slovenia's FDI per capita is still well above the average for Eastern Europe as a whole, as is the case for the other members of the original accession group of five countries, apart from Poland. There is a strong suggestion here that investors have to a great extent anticipated accession of these five countries to the EU, just as governments have to a considerable extent anticipated accession in terms of regulatory and institutional reforms. Thus Havas points out, in relation to the car industry, that ...the first major investment decisions had been made before the Central European countries became associate members of the European Union, i.e. economic integration preceded the start of the fairly lengthy and cumbersome process of political integration. Most likely, though, both parties -managers of the Western European automotive firms and Central European government officials -anticipated potential EU membership in their medium term scenarios. (Havas, 1999, p.10) In the case of Hungary in particular, we should therefore be cautious about predicting a new leap in levels of FDI with accession. Membership of the EU will surely help to ensure that FDI in that country continues to grow, but the impact on the trend line may be minimal. The Slovenian cases is somewhat different. Here, accession will complete the process of change in the laws on foreign investment, and will also involve the dismantling of the system of state aids which has been an important indirect barrier to foreign acquisition of Slovenian companies. Taking the two countries together, however, accession is unlikely to make a dramatic difference to trends in FDI.
Trust
As argued earlier, trust and contracts should not be seen as alternatives. Rather, good contracts, or at least good contract law, makes for trust, while trust, in particular trust in courts, is in turn a key condition for the implementation of the rule of law in the commercial sphere, as in other spheres. How will accession to the European Union strengthen this virtuous circle for Hungarian and Slovenian firms? To the extent that it improves the enforceability of contracts in Hungarian and Slovenian courts, to the extent that in improving and strengthening competition law within those countries it reins in abuse of monopoly power against third-tier suppliers, to the extent that it fills lacunae and removes weaknesses and inconsistencies in domestic regulatory regimes, it should make lead partners, mainly foreign partners, more willing to build close cooperative links with firms from those countries, while at the same time making it more difficult for them to exploit those cooperative links for purely short-term corporate advantage. But we should be cautious about pressing this conclusion too hard. One of the most striking qualitative features to emerge from our interviews is the universal aversion to domestic courts of law as a recourse when firms are let down by partners. Virtually every firm we interviewed declared that such action would only ever be taken as a very last resort. In a word, firms trust their partners, even their bad partners, more than they trust the courts. This distrust of the courts no doubt reflects weaknesses in the regulatory regime as well as in the legal system per se. It does, nevertheless, suggest that there is some fundamental deficiency of social capability in the Slovenian and Hungarian legal systems. The literature on economic 'catch-up' argues that making up for such deficiencies is a long-term process (see Verspagen, 1999) . Accession to the EU could reasonably be expected to facilitate and hasten that process, but not to solve the problem in a day. And as long as Slovenian and Hungarian firms remain reluctant to use their own courts of law, foreign firms are likely to remain at least as cautious. To that extent, the nexus of trust and contract enforceability is likely to strengthen gradually rather than dramatically after accession.
The extension of EU intellectual property protection to the target countries should remove a very specific factor which has hindered the development of trust on the part of Western companies vis-à-vis Eastern partners up to now. IPNs (see discussion in section 1). built around key elements of intellectual property and designed to access heterogeneous capabilities across frontiers (Borrus & Zysman, 1997) , are bound to expand their activities in East European countries as the latter accede to the EU. But IPNs were initially developed -with great success -by American companies in East Asia, where there are no common markets and where intellectual property regimes are weak and non-standardised. So there are no strong grounds for arguing that in the East European case accession will be a critical factor in the development of IPNs.
Closeness of cooperation
Granted that a whole range of accession-related factors will have a positive, indirect impact on closeness of cooperation, we can pose two basic questions:
· Will accession in itself make it easier to develop close cooperation?
· Will it become easier to use close cooperation as a springboard for deep cooperation?
It is, in fact, difficult to see how accession per se could have a major direct impact on the scope for developing close cooperation. The ability and the readiness to engage in the exchange of tacit knowledge is in the first instance a function of the corporate strategies of the companies involved and the professional ethos and attitudes of their employees, variables hardly likely to be significantly affected by the signature of international treaties. It does also seem to be dependent to an important degree on the degree of technological congruence (see section 1) between the firms involved. A sophisticated German machine-tool company will, not, for instance, be interested in setting up close cooperation with a village blacksmith's shop in rural Hungary or Slovenia. And research done on the Polish economy shows that foreign investors in that country have shown a strong preference for investment in activities based on the same generic technologies as are used in their plants located in more advanced countries (Dyker & Kubielas, 2000) . Technological congruence is clearly primarily a function of inherited capital, human capital and technology endowments. None of those factors will be significantly affected by the act of accession in itself. But to the extent that accession increases investment by reducing risk premia, as strongly argued by, e.g. Baldwin, Francois, & Portes (1997) , the rate of replacement of capital stock will accelerate after accession, and this could make technological closeness significantly easier to attain. Our interviews show clearly that close cooperation generally goes together with generosity on the part of lead firms in relation to IPRs, and it will certainly be easier for lead firms to be generous with their intellectual property in CEE once it is protected by EU law in that region. Beyond that, accession may produce a degree of rapprochement between the business cultures of Western and Central-East Europe which could facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge. But this would be a slow process, unlikely to produce any significant impact in the short run.
The same basic arguments apply to the close cooperation/deep cooperation issue. There is clearly no deep cooperation without technological congruence, and if accession makes lead firms feel more secure, in IPR terms, about close cooperation, then surely it will make them feel more secure about deep cooperation. The convergence of business culture factor could be rather more important in relation to deep than to 'merely' close cooperation. In addition to encouraging deep cooperation, accession may positively discourage cooperation that is close, but shallow. As our interviews show, that kind of close cooperation is usually part of the survival strategy of a firm intent on subsisting from day to day. By increasing the strength of competition, accession will tend to force firms like that to sink or swim, and this may have a significant impact on the balance of deep and shallow cooperation.
Attaining the status of first-tier supplier
Every specific accession-related factor, whether it be improved frameworks for FDI and intellectual property protection, improved access to markets, easier optimisation of production capacity etc, will help firms from Hungary and Slovenia to become first-tier suppliers, because it will increase the willingness of international firms to develop long-term relations with firms from those two countries, because it will remove constraints on the efficient utilisation by the Hungarian and Slovenian firms of their countries' factor endowments, and because it will facilitate integration into the currents of micro-specialisation which have dominated the evolution of the pattern of intra-industry trade within the existing EU over the past four decades. But the evidence from Slovenia and Hungary suggests (though it certainly does not prove) that the capacity to operate as a first-tier supplier is in the first instance a function of levels of aggregate social productivity and firm-specific capabilities. So it is not enough to be able to use your factor endowments efficiently -you may have to improve that endowment in order to achieve first-tier-supplier status.
How will accession improve aggregate social productivity? Not through specific impacts, but rather through the positive influence of accession on aggregate growth rates of GDP in the accession countries. There are strong a priori arguments for expecting just such an acceleration of economic growth after enlargement. But if the acceleration does not materialise, the macroeconomic conditions for the development of first-tier supplier status will remain problematic. On the microeconomic side, how can accession enhance the capabilities of specific firms? The opening-up of markets, the exploitation of economies of scale will certainly help firms to improve their capabilities as well as to marshall them more efficiently. To the extent that accession produces increased flows of FDI, that will also help. Stricter policing of intellectual property rights probably will, but might not. Where Slovenian and Hungarian firms have had difficulty in defending their own IPRs against predation from outside the EU (mostly from the Far East), membership of the EU should make it easier for them to protect and develop their in-house intellectual property base. Where, however, lead firms are inclined to be restrictive in their IPR policy vis-à-vis suppliers in the target countries, EU membership will make it easier for them to be so. As noted in the last subsection, however, far more of the firms interviewed reported generous IPR policies vis-à-vis close collaborators than did the opposite behaviour.
Deficiencies of social capability as discussed above may have a direct effect on levels of social productivity and particular capabilities at firm level. More specifically, weaknesses in the public-sector R&D and education sectors may impose severe constraints on the learning processes which serve as the primary vehicle for the enhancement of, in particular, human capital endowment, at the level of both firm and society. Education systems in the ex-communist countries have struggled to keep up with the demands imposed on them by the process of transformation.
But it is R&D systems in particular that have remained stubbornly unreformed through ten years of transition and EU technical assistance.
Understandable weakness of market orientation apart, the old communist S&T systems suffered from a number of critical scientific weaknesses. While they were strong in basic science, at least in the more traditional hard sciences like physics and chemistry, they were weak in applied sciences, or rather they were weak in science as applied to innovation, and weak in emerging disciplines like biotechnology and artificial intelligence.
The administrative structures of communist science, dominated by the Academies of Sciences, were conservative and hierarchical, and the process of innovation was understood, to the extent that it was understood at all, in terms of a crude, linear, science-push conception.
While the process of transition has revolutionised the understanding of the process of innovation, it has failed to revolutionise the configuration of S&T among the accession countries. The administration of science is still controlled by the old Academy of Sciences in Hungary., as it is in Poland. In Slovenia the Academy is less important, but structures are still dominated by a conservative scientific lobby. A corollary of this administrative conservatism has been a tendency to maintain the traditional split between research (usually in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences) and training of postgraduate students (usually in the universities), in the face of all the evidence from the West to the effect that the biggest contribution basic research makes to economic development is precisely in terms of training postgraduate students (Senker & Faulkner, 1995; Pavitt, 1996) . While S&T expenditure as a whole in CEE has contracted sharply, expenditure on applied research has generally contracted more sharply than expenditure on basic science (Gokhberg, 1999) , as the scientific lobbies have defended their vested interests rather more effectively than the industrial R&D organisations. And analysis of the pattern of 'disciplinary comparative advantage', based on shares in world citations, indicates that the strengths of basic science in the post-communist countries are still very heavily concentrated in Physics, Mathematics and Chemistry and in some branches of engineering (Kozlowski & Ircha, 1999) . The fact that numbers of S&T personnel have fallen more gently than expenditure reflects less devotion to science than resistance to redeployment. Policies to encourage the development of 'Academy-industry links' adopted in the mid-1990s, notably in Hungary, produced some isolated successes but had no great impact at the aggregate level (Balázs, 1996; Jasinski, 1997) . The tendency through the mid-1990s was for the proportion of total GERD (gross expenditure on research and development) financed by the business sector to fall. In Slovenia the business sector is currently the main funder of R&D in the country, but the government continues to finance more than half total GERD in Hungary. In short, much of the inherited S&T complex in the transition countries is still waiting to be restructured, and in extreme cases should be considered a 'liability' rather than an asset to the accession countries (Meske, 1999) . There is no basis for believing that accession to the EU will have any impact on this stubborn problem. So one major obstacle to the enhancement of social productivity and firm-level capabilities, and indirectly to the attainment by companies of first-tier-supplier status, is likely to survive into the long term.
Accession and outward processing
As noted earlier, OPT developed initially as a way of exploiting the scope for dutyfree export of raw materials from EU countries to CEECs followed by duty-free reimport of the same materials, made up, into the EU. As it blossomed in the earlymid-1990s, it was largely restricted to traditional low-tech sectors like textiles, and the prize, for the EU entrepreneurs involved, was access to cheap labour.
Accession to the EU for Hungary and Slovenia will mean the end, not only to tariffs on the interface with the existing Union, but also to the possibility of contingent protection -anti-dumping measures and the like. In that sense, the whole original motive for engaging in OPT will fall away. And with wage levels in the accession countries converging to Western (or at least Southern) European levels after enlargement, the underlying economic rationale for OPT will weaken. A strictly 'neo-classical' model of OPT might, therefore, predict the total disappearance of this category of trade with, or soon after, accession. The responses to our interviews suggest a rather different path. The essential definition of OPT is the identity of main supplier and main buyer. The interviews show that such an arrangement does not exclude technology transfer and innovation in product lines, and may, indeed, provide a basis for dramatic increases in the levels of capability of the firm concerned in the middle-tech sectors that we are primarily concerned with in this study. Given that, and given that accession to the EU will at least get rid of the complex paperwork associated with OPT at the present time, accession may actually lead to an increase in some types of OPT. But the increase may be short-lived, because, as the interviews strikingly show, the more dynamic the OPT relationship, the more likely it is to evolve into something qualitatively different. We return to this theme in the next section.
Climbing the technological ladder
Whatever the difficulties associated with specific networking 'milestones' like the attainment of first-tier-supplier status, one of the strongest impressions to come out of our interviews is of a dominant upward mobility in terms of technology, product range etc. The first decade of transition has witnessed a substantial increase in real wages in Slovenia but not in Hungary. 8 Competition at the lower end of the technological ladder from low-wage countries like China has, nevertheless, increased for both of them. So our target countries have discovered a truth which has, indeed, been evident to the developed industrialised countries for many years -that you cannot stand still on the technological ladder; you have to keep moving up, otherwise you go out of business. Supply networking has not shielded Hungarian and Slovenian companies from the competitive pressures which force this upward movement. But it has made the upward movement less painful, because it has facilitated the acquisition of the new technologies which that upward movement requires. Accession to the EU will affect the networking elements conducive to this upgrading process only to a marginal extent. But in unifying markets, including labour markets, it will increase the pressure on companies in Hungary and Slovenia to upgrade further. On the most optimistic scenario, higher wages will simply induce a higher valuation of the existing human capital endowments of the transition countries and greater efforts to ensure, through networking, that those endowments are efficiently marshalled. The downside risk is that the competitive pressures are too powerful, that companies are not strong enough, in themselves and in their networking capacity, to respond positively. In practice, some companies will past the test, others will not. The results of interviews suggest that the pass rate will be fairly high.
Conclusions
How far has our research succeeded in filling the 'empty boxes' of Table 1 ? We have evoked a picture of the Hungarian and Slovenian firm as a striving, learning organization, strongly dependent on an interactive complex of local, national and global networks as a source of information, learning and innovation. The degree and pattern of dependence varies, and Hungarian firms are generally more dependent on global networks than Slovenian. Close cooperation does not always mean deep cooperation, and deep cooperation can sometimes involve a reduction in the level of dependence on (N.B. not in that of integration into) global networks. A much more homogeneous picture emerges in relation to the extent of skepticism about the role of the state in relation to network-building. The picture may not be wholly typical -a good deal of our material is anecdotal, and our interview sets not wholly representative. But it is surely accurate for a large number of companies from the target countries.
The policy-related implications of these conclusions are essentially straightforward.
Companies will continue to upgrade their firm-specific capabilities in function of their involvement in networks, and of trends in the general level of social productivity and social capability in their respective countries.
The impact of national support programmes will be marginal. Accession to the EU will facilitate the strengthening of networks in the target countries through its impact on FDI, IPR regimes and systems of legal recourse. But it will do so by reinforcing existing trends rather than producing breaks in trend. Accession will make it easier for firms from Hungary and Slovenia to develop closeness and depth in their networking relationships, and to achieve first-tier supplier status. But the impact will be gradual rather than dramatic. Accession could well result in a short-term increase in the volume of some types of OPT. In the long-run, however, the impact is likely to be in the opposite direction. In assimilating the Hungarian and Slovenian labour markets to the West European, accession should tend to increase real wages in those countries, which is likely to force their companies to increase the rate at which they climb the technological ladder -as the only alternative to bankruptcy. In a word, the pattern of network alignment and realignment will reflect the interaction of the logic of markets and the imperatives of developing intra-firm capabilities, with the public sector playing a strictly subsidiary role.
